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ABSTRACT
Policymakers in the United States face a combination of high and rising federal debt 
and low current and projected interest rates on that debt. Rising future debt will reduce 
growth and impede efforts to enact new policy initiatives. Low interest rates reduce, 
but do not eliminate, these concerns. The federal fiscal outlook is unsustainable even 
with projected interest rates that remain below the growth rate for the next 30 years. 
Short-term policy responses should focus on investments that are preferably tax-
financed rather than debt-financed. Most importantly, policymakers should enact a 
debt reduction plan that is gradually implemented over the medium- and long-term. 
This would avoid reducing aggregate demand significantly in the short-term and, if 
done well, could actually stimulate current consumption and production. It would 
stimulate growth in the long-term, provide fiscal insurance against higher interest 
rates or other adverse outcomes, give businesses and individuals clarity about future 
policy and time to adjust, and provide policymakers with assurance that they could 
consider new initiatives within a framework of sustainable fiscal policy.  
* Brookings Institution and Tax Policy Center. This chapter was prepared for the Aspen Economic Strategy 
Group and is an adaptation and extension of Fiscal Therapy: Curing America’s Debt Addiction and Investing 
in the Future (Oxford 2019). I thank Aaron Krupkin and Victoria Johnson for outstanding assistance and Alan 
Auerbach, Doug Elmendorf, Amy Ganz, Marc Goldwein, Melissa Kearney, Maya MacGuineas, Emily Merola, 
Brian Riedl, and David Wessel for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction
U.S. policymakers face a combination of high and rising federal debt and low current 
and projected interest rates on that debt. Figure 1 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
at its highest level in U.S. history, except for a few years around World War II, and that 
government net interest payments (the product of debt and the average interest rate) 
are currently at their average historical level as a share of the economy. 
 
Rising future debt will slowly but surely make it harder to grow our economy, boost 
our living standards, respond to wars or recessions, address social needs, and 
maintain our role as a global leader. 
Lower interest rates reduce these concerns, holding other factors constant (such as 
economic growth rates). At the very least, low interest rates undermine claims that 
current debt levels will cause a financial crisis. More generally, low rates reduce 
the fiscal cost of debt accumulation. To the extent that low interest rates indicate 
a reduced marginal private return to capital, the opportunity cost of government 
borrowing falls, making it more attractive to pursue new government programs, 
particularly investments.   
However, low interest rates are not a “get out of jail free” card.  Although interest rates 
are low, seemingly every other major aspect of the fiscal situation is problematic. The 
Figure 1: Debt and Net Interest as a Share of GDP, 1940-2019
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2019b); Office of Management and Budget (2019)
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full-employment deficit is already high and is expected to remain at elevated levels in 
the absence of policy changes; in the past, it spiked only on a temporary basis. Short-
term deficits will rise further if policymakers extend temporary tax and spending 
provisions, as they have done repeatedly in the past. Over the longer term, even if 
interest rates stay below the growth rate, interest payments will rise steadily to over 
6% of the economy—as large as Social Security outlays—under standard assumptions. 
And even if interest rates stay constant, interest payments will rise because the debt 
is rising. Likewise, Social Security and health care outlays will continue to rise because 
of the aging of the population. These three program areas—interest payments, Social 
Security, and health care—will account for more than 100% of all federal spending 
growth as a share of GDP.  In contrast, federal investments in infrastructure, research 
and development, and human capital are slated to decline.  Meanwhile, several major 
federal trust funds—including Social Security and Medicare—are slated to exhaust their 
balances within the next 15 years;1 the budget is largely on autopilot, with mandatory 
programs, which are not annually appropriated, accounting for an increasing share of 
federal outlays over time; and the political system seems broken, with political leaders 
unable to muster the cooperation and trust—or even the interest—that bipartisan fiscal 
agreements typically require. But the longer we wait to make policy changes, the 
larger and more abrupt those changes will need to be, unless interest rates stay at or 
close to their current levels for the next 30 years.2  
Because of these considerations, low interest rates do not necessarily eliminate the 
unsustainability of the long-term fiscal position of the U.S. government. This point is 
explicitly recognized by those economists who argue most strongly for the salience 
of low interest rates for policy choices (Blanchard, 2019a, 2019b; Elmendorf, 2019; 
Elmendorf & Sheiner, 2017; Furman & Summers, 2019). Krugman (2019) and Furman 
and Summers (2019) argue against expanding even the short-term deficit, except for 
financing investments or fighting recessions.  
Under what I view as standard assumptions, where future interest rates rise but 
remain below the growth rate for the whole projection period, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is projected to rise more or less continually from its current level of 78% to 169% by 
2049.  To limit the debt-to-GDP ratio to 100% by 2049 would require permanent tax 
increases or spending cuts starting in 2021 equal to 2.3% of GDP. If policy adjustments 
are delayed to 2029, the required annual change would equal 3.2% of GDP.  Even if 
interest rates remain constant over the next 30 years, the debt would rise to 134% of 
1 CBO (2019b, 2019c) projects exhaustion over the next 15 years for the trust funds for Social Security, 
Disability Insurance, Medicare Part A, Highways, and Pension benefits and for the Guaranty Corporation Multi-
Employer Fund.
2 Other exacerbating factors include: The Fed’s efforts to unwind its portfolio of Treasury debt; rising debt 
issued by the States; the low U.S. saving rate compared to many other countries; declines in foreigners’ 
willingness to hold federal debt; efforts by other countries and leading corporations to develop new payment 
systems that could threaten the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. None of these factors is decisive, 
in and of itself, but none of them helps the fiscal situation, either.
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GDP and the required permanent policy adjustment to limit the debt-to-GDP ratio to 
100% would be about 1.3% of GDP. 
Finally, while lower interest rates improve the federal government’s overall fiscal 
stance—because it is a net borrower—they come with two additional caveats. First, we 
can certainly borrow more and consume more with low interest rates and not hurt 
future generations (who can in turn borrow more from later generations), but the 
optimality of this pattern falls apart if interest rates subsequently rise and we are left 
with higher interest rates on higher levels of debt.  Second, low interest rates raise 
the present value of future spending obligations, like those for Social Security and 
Medicare. In the past, policymakers have chosen to pre-fund a certain share of these 
obligations. With lower interest rates, any level of pre-funding will be more difficult to 
achieve; (i.e., it will require higher taxes or lower spending than with higher interest 
rates). Policymakers will have to choose between imposing higher burdens to reach 
a given level of pre-funding or pre-funding these programs to a lesser extent than 
in the past.3 
How should policymakers respond? They should not try to reduce the short-term 
deficit. That is not the problem; the long-term projection is. In addition, cutting current 
deficits would likely reduce aggregate demand, a change that monetary policy may 
be hard-pressed to offset, given low interest rates.
Policymakers should also enact new investment programs. We need more 
infrastructure, research and development, and human capital, even apart from the 
fiscal stance. I conclude that it would be preferable—based on fiscal and economic 
growth considerations—to fund these projects with taxes rather than deficits. But, 
if given the choice between deficit-financed investments and no investments, 
policymakers should choose the former. 
In contrast, except for antirecession purposes, policymakers should not enact deficit-
financed spending for non-investment programs, though they should embrace a 
broad definition of what constitutes an investment, to include programs that make 
people more productive by providing childcare, job training, and related items.
Finally, policymakers should enact in the near term a plan that is implemented on 
a gradual, phased-in basis and substantially reduces long-term deficits and debt 
from future projected values. This approach would avoid reducing current aggregate 
demand significantly. Indeed, if done well, it could boost current spending and 
production. It would help the economy in the long-term and thereby reduce burdens 
on members of future generations, many of whom will not be better off than their 
3 When the Social Security or Medicare trust fund runs an annual surplus, the excess funds are invested in 
bonds at the Treasury. The interest rate that the Treasury Department pays to these programs depends on 
recent average yields on federal debt. As a result, lower interest rates reduce the returns that the trust funds 
receive and thus make it more costly to achieve a given level of pre-funding. (In a similar fashion, low rates of 
return make it more difficult for pension funds to finance future obligations.) 
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parents. It would provide some fiscal insurance against interest rate jumps or 
other adverse fiscal outcomes; with debt already at high levels relative to GDP and 
projected to rise, the budget is more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations now than 
it has been in the past. 
A gradual phase-in would provide time for businesses, investors, and citizens to adjust 
their plans and would reduce political backlash. Finally, a debt reduction plan would 
give economic agents more certainty about future policy and offer policymakers 
assurance that they could undertake new initiatives within a framework of sustainable 
fiscal policy.
To move into specific examples, policymakers should consider three sets of policies.
• Some gradual, debt-reduction policies could stimulate consumption and 
production now. Enacting a consumption tax (value-added tax) whose rates 
rose gradually over time would stimulate current consumption as customers 
spent more today to avoid higher future prices. Likewise, introducing a 
carbon tax with rates that rise over time could stimulate current production, 
as producers choose to use more fossil fuels now while they are still relatively 
inexpensive.4  Both policies could generate significant long-term revenues.  
• Some gradual, debt-reduction policies are needed in their own right. Making 
Social Security sustainable is one example. Another is boosting health-care 
coverage and reducing costs (by creating a public option on the exchanges, 
converting Medicare to a premium support plan, allowing Medicare to 
negotiate drug prices and formulary, and limiting the tax subsidy for health 
insurance for families with above median-cost plans).
• In addition to debt reduction, policymakers should initiate substantial new 
investment programs in infrastructure and research and development (1% of 
GDP) and in children, families, and human capital (another 1% of GDP). These 
changes can be financed by closing income tax loopholes and converting the 
corporate tax to a 25% cash flow levy.
All these policies could be phased in gradually, and together they would be sufficient 
to stabilize debt below 100% of GDP over the long-term. (They would reduce 2049 
debt to 60% of GDP if initiated in 2021.)5 Even if policymakers adopt a different 
way to reduce long-term debt and make new investments in America, enacting a 
reasonable, gradual debt reduction plan would be a major improvement over the 
current situation. 
4 Both the consumption tax and carbon tax could be accompanied by other policy changes that would offset 
the regressivity of the taxes. Phasing in a carbon taxes need not create a “Green Paradox” situation where 
imposing future carbon taxes raises overall greenhouse gas emissions. See Sinn (2012) and Williams (2016). 
5 For more details on the effects of these policies, see Gale (2019).
Fiscal Policy With High Debt and Low Interest Rates       83
These conclusions are guided by several overarching themes. First, the nation faces 
two intertwined problems: The rising, long-term debt profile and the way we tax 
and spend.  Government spending is too oriented toward consumption relative to 
investment, the latter broadly defined to include human capital. Likewise, our tax 
system could be fairer and more efficient and could produce more revenue. Offering 
a debt reduction plan provides an opportunity to address simultaneously the debt 
problem and the structure and composition of taxes and spending. 
Second, the economy is more important than the budget. Saving the budget but 
hurting the economy would be a Pyrrhic victory. This seems to be a particularly salient 
issue currently. Normally, in an economy with unemployment at a 60-year low and 
the full-employment deficit for several years projected to be at least 5% of GDP, 
the obvious prescription would be significant, fairly rapid fiscal consolidation—tax 
increases, spending cuts. With current low interest rates, low inflation, and concerns 
about weak growth even amidst remarkably accommodative monetary and fiscal 
policy, however, it would be prudent to make any fiscal adjustments gradually. 
Third, historical patterns can inform the current fiscal situation. In many ways, we 
are in uncharted territory. We have never had to address the projected permanent 
imbalances between spending and taxes that we face now. In some ways, though, 
the closest historical antecedent to our current status occurred after World War II, 
when the United States faced even higher debt as a share of the economy than today, 
and even lower interest rates. But the cause of the debt (wartime spending) and the 
composition of government spending (low entitlement outlays) were very different 
then. In any case, the debt-to-GDP ratio fell rapidly as military spending fell and the 
nation essentially ran balanced primary budgets from 1947-1980. In contrast, we are 
currently projected to run permanent, substantial primary deficits. 
Finally, apart from all the specific arguments, a broader view might be constructive. 
Although the interest rate on government debt has been less than the economic 
growth rate more often than not historically in the United States (Blanchard 2019a, 
2019b) and in other countries (Mauro, Romeu, Binder, & Zaman, 2015), it appears to 
be a long-standing convention that governments do voluntarily run up their debt. In 
2007, for example, before the financial crisis raised debt levels everywhere, only two 
OECD member countries (Greece and Italy) had general government net financial 
liabilities, relative to GDP, in excess of the current value for the United States (OECD, 
2019). Keeping a lid on debt may be simply an outdated, prudish norm that does not 
apply to the economic situation facing the United States today. Alternatively, there 
might be very good reasons for this behavior—the desire to maintain “fiscal space,” a 
concern that high debt reduces growth and imposes burdens on future generations, 
etc.—and therefore some wisdom embedded in those established government 
practices.
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The rest of the paper develops the points above in more detail.  Section 2 reviews the 
fiscal outlook under varying assumptions about interest rates, to provide context and 
outline where we are headed. Section 3 explains why the projections are worrisome 
and discusses the economic effects of rising debt and deficits. Section 4 presents 
estimates of the fiscal gap, the size of policy changes needed to reach particular fiscal 
targets. Section 5 discusses in more detail how policymakers should respond. Section 
6 concludes. (Appendix A provides details of the budget projections. Appendix B 
explains the flaws in three separate claims that debt does not matter.)   
2. Where Are We Headed? 
I develop 30-year budget projections under what I view as a continuation of “current 
policies.” (See Appendix A for details). The key, long-term assumptions relate to 
growth rates and interest rates. I follow the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
(2019c) in setting the nominal annual growth rate to average 4% after 2029 and 
the average nominal interest rate on government debt to rise gradually from 2.4% 
in 2019 to 3.9% in 2049. This 150-basis-point increase—which I call the “standard” 
scenario—keeps the interest rate below the growth rate throughout the entire period 
and is consistent with the effects of rising government debt (of the magnitude shown 
in the projections below that use this interest rate path) found in several studies.6 
Because the fiscal outlook depends sensitively on interest rates and because financial 
market indicators currently imply lower future interest rates than the CBO does, 
I also consider a “flat” scenario, where the average interest rate on government 
debt is constant through 2049 at its 2019 value of 2.4%.7 To be clear, I regard this 
as an optimistic scenario, and I include it to highlight the effects of low interest rate 
projections on the fiscal outlook.
The budget outlook can be described in a series of graphs. Figure 2 shows that primary 
deficits (which exclude interest payments) will rise from 2.4% of GDP currently to 3.8% 
of GDP by 2029, then remain relatively constant through 2039, after which they fall 
to 2.7% of GDP by 2049. The main point of Figure 2 is that the federal budget is out 
of balance on a long-term basis, even ignoring interest rates and interest payments. 
In contrast, in the generation following World War II, the government ran primary 
surpluses more often than not and the primary budget averaged a deficit of just 0.1% 
of GDP from 1947-1980.
6 See Engen and Hubbard (2005); Gale and Orszag (2004); Gamber and Seliski (2019); Krishnamurthy and 
Jorgenson (2012); Laubach (2009); and Tedeschi (2019). These studies show that a 1 percentage point 
increase in federal debt as a share of GDP raises interest rates by 2 to 3 basis points.
7 Using interest rate forecasts based on current financial market data may not be appropriate in a budget 
projection because those forecasts presumably include a positive probability that some sort of budget deal is 
reached before the budget period ends, which is inconsistent with the assumptions in the budget projection.
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The persistent primary deficits are best interpreted as the result of a long-term, 
sizable mismatch between what Americans want from their government and what 
they are willing to contribute, rather than as a “spending” problem or a “tax” problem. 
Figure 3 shows that non-interest spending is projected to be substantially higher 
throughout the next 30 years (20.8% of GDP) than its average since 1965 (18.2% of 
GDP).  Notably, there are no new spending initiatives built into the projections, which 
simply show the playing out of commitments that political leaders made in the past. 
Given the aging of the population, it is virtually inevitable that government spending 
will rise. Projected revenues average 17.4% of GDP over the next 30 years, equal to 
their post-1965 average.
Figure 4 provides more details on the changing level and composition of non-interest 
spending, assuming there are no new spending programs for the next 30 years. 
Spending on Social Security and health care will rise, accounting for more than 100% 
of the increase in non-interest spending as a share of GDP. Outlays on all other non-
interest categories will fall. Non-defense, discretionary spending includes most of the 
federal government’s investment projects in infrastructure, research, and education. 
Other mandatory spending contains most of the government’s safety net 
initiatives. These two categories and defense spending are all slated to fall by 
between 19% and 31% relative to GDP over the next 30 years. 
Figure 2: Primary Deficit (+) or Surplus (-) as a Share of GDP, 1947-2019
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional 
Budget Office (2019b, 2019c); Office of Management and Budget (2019)
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Figure 3: Primary Deficit as a Share of GDP, 2019-2049
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional 
Budget Office (2019b, 2019c)
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Figure 3. Primary Deficit as a Share of GDP, 2019-2049
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Figure 4: Non-Interest Spending Projections, 2019-2049
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional 
Budget Office (2019b, 2019c)
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Figure 5 shows that the interest rate scenario makes an enormous difference to 
budget projections. With “standard” rates, interest payments rise from 1.8% of GDP 
in 2019 to 3.4% of GDP in 2029, and to 6.2% of GDP in 2049. If interest rates remain 
at today’s low levels, interest payments rise at a much slower pace, to 2.3% of GDP 
in 2029 and 3.1% of GDP in 2049. By comparison, interest payments averaged 1.8% 
of GDP from 1947 to 2019 and equaled 1.6% of GDP in 2018. In 1991, interest 
payments reached their historical peak of 3.2% of GDP. Thus, under the optimistic 
scenario (“flat” rates), interest payments are projected to rise almost to their historical 
maximum; under “standard” rates, interest payments will skyrocket to almost double 
their previous peak. 
Figure 6 combines the primary deficit and interest payments to show projections 
for the federal deficit. As before, interest rate assumptions matter significantly. 
With standard interest rates, the deficit rises from 4.2% of GDP currently to 7.2% 
in 2029 and to 9% of GDP by 2049. With flat interest rates, the deficit still rises to 
about 6.1% of GDP by 2029 and 6.6% by 2040, after which it drops to 5.8% of GDP 
by 2049. The deficit falls somewhat in the out-years because of the very strong and 
restrictive assumptions about discretionary spending and other mandatory outlays 
described above. 
Figure 7 shows historical and projected figures for debt as a share of GDP. With 
standard interest rates, debt rises from 78% of GDP in 2019 to 106% of GDP in 2029 
and 169% of GDP by 2049. With flat rates, debt rises much more slowly, but it still 
rises inexorably and to all-time high levels. The debt rises from 78% of GDP in 2019 
to 98% of GDP in 2029 and to 134% of GDP in 2049.
Several aspects of the debt projection are salient. First, the projected fiscal shortfall 
differs from those in the past in important ways. From the nation’s founding until 
about 1980, debt as a share of the economy rose only when we were at war or in 
recession, and it only rose temporarily. After the war or recession ended, debt fell 
rapidly. Starting in 1981, President Ronald Reagan’s tax cuts and defense-spending 
increases raised debt during peacetime prosperity. A series of largely bipartisan tax 
increases and budget deals from 1992 to 1997 helped turn persistent deficits into 
surpluses by the end of the century. Since 2000, tax cuts and spending increases 
under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, along with 
the Great Recession, greatly boosted current and projected levels of future debt.
The current economic and budget projections are different from those in the past. 
Relative to pre-1980 debt, current projected debt-to-GDP ratios are higher, and the 
trend is permanent. There is no war or recession that will end and let the budget 
adjust. Relative to the early 1980s, we now face a much higher initial debt level and 
the headwinds generated by demographics. In 1981, debt was only one-third as 
large as it is today relative to GDP, and the economy benefitted from the steady influx 
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Figure 5: Net Interest as a Share of GDP, 2019-2049
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional Budget 
Office (2019b, 2019c)
Figure 6: Deficit as a Share of GDP, 2019-2049
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional Budget 
Office (2019b, 2019c)
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of baby boomers and women into the labor market. Now, boomers are retiring en 
masse and women’s labor force participation has plateaued. 
The experience after World War II is particularly informative. After the war, the debt-
to-GDP ratio fell more or less continually, from 106% of GDP in 1944 to about 26% of 
GDP in 1980. Part of the reason was low interest rates and strong growth, but another 
factor was that primary deficits were quite small (averaging just 0.1% of GDP from 
1947 to 1980). Currently, however, as discussed above, primary deficits are projected 
to average 3.4% of GDP over the next 30 years, even under optimistic assumptions 
(Figure 2). While we don’t need to cut the debt to 1980 levels, we do need to stabilize 
it at a reasonable amount. That will require significant reductions in the primary deficit.
Second, long-term projections are sometimes dismissed on the grounds that they 
are subject to substantial uncertainty (Krugman, 2012). But it is not necessary to focus 
on the long-term to see the fiscal imbalance. Figure 8 shows that the current full-
employment deficit is already high at almost 5% and will remain high—and actually 
rise—over the next decade, assuming that policymakers extend temporary tax and 
spending provisions, as they have done in the past (see Appendix A).  Historically, 
full-employment deficits have been much lower (averaging 2.8% of GDP since 1965) 
and only spiked temporarily. 
Another short-term indicator of concern is that, according to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States is one of only a handful of advanced countries 
projected to experience a rise in their debt-to-GDP ratio over the next 5 years and 
indeed will experience the largest increase among those countries (International 
Monetary Fund, 2019).8 
Third, it is worth emphasizing that the projections above are based on relatively 
optimistic economic and policy assumptions. The economy grows steadily; interest 
rates stay below the economic growth rate; there are no unusual or deep recessions; 
and climate change does not impose any extra burden on the economy. Defense 
spending grows only with inflation. There are no new wars. There are no new, major 
spending initiatives, and domestic spending other than for Social Security and health 
care falls significantly relative to the size of the economy. One way to show how 
optimistic the assumptions are is to note that, under plausible alternative assumptions, 
the CBO (2019c) estimates the debt-to-GDP ratio would be 219%, compared to 169% 
in the estimates here.   
8 Short-term projections are based on officially announced budgets, adjusted for differences between the 
national authorities and the IMF staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions. The medium-term fiscal 
projections incorporate policy measures that are judged by the IMF staff as likely to be implemented.
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Figure 7: Debt-to-GDP, 1790-2049
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional Budget 
Office (2019b, 2019c)
Figure 8: Full-Employment Deficit as a Share of GDP, 1965-2029
Source: Author's calculation; Board of Trustees (2019); Boards of Trustees (2019); Congressional Budget 
Office (2019b, 2019c)
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Figure 7. Debt-to-GDP, 1790-2049
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3. Effects of Rising Debt and Deficits 
If left unaddressed, rising deficits and debt will cause significant, long-term economic 
problems, curtailing growth and limiting the rise of living standards for our children 
and grandchildren. They will also hamper the government’s ability to address other 
issues and will reduce America’s global standing. Despite public controversy about 
fiscal policy, there is a well-established consensus—even with current projections 
keeping the government interest rate (r) below the economic growth rate (g) and 
even among those who advocate not addressing the long-term fiscal situation now—
that following our current fiscal path would do long-term damage to the economy 
and is unsustainable.9 
3.1 Debt and the Economy 
Not all debt is bad. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the 1790s, debt helps the 
government establish credit and trade with other nations. It gives investors a safe 
and liquid asset, provided the government stays solvent.10 It helps nations finance 
their responses to emergencies, such as recessions or wars, and it helps finance 
investments in people or projects that will raise future living standards. And, of course, 
deficits can provide a boost when the economy falls into recession. 
In short, the effects of fiscal policies on the economy depend not only on the timing 
and size of the deficits but also on the specific policies that generated those deficits. 
The concern about the projected long-term debt build-up, then, is not just about 
the debt, per se; it is also about the way we are taxing and spending. The path we 
are on produces a rising debt-to-GDP ratio that essentially is financing increased 
transfer payments to the elderly (Figure 4, Figure 7). Meanwhile, public investment 
in infrastructure, scientific research, and human capital are projected to decline as a 
share of GDP, as are safety net expenditures that can help low-income families lead 
more productive lives.
Following this path will reduce future national income. If the government borrows to 
provide a tax cut or spending benefit, government saving falls by the full amount of 
the borrowing, while recipients save some (but typically not all) of the tax cut or the 
9 See Blanchard (2019a, 2019b); Furman and Summers (2019); Elmendorf (2019); Elmendorf and Sheiner 
(2017). All conventional economic models suggest that high and rising debt-to-GDP ratios will hamper 
long-term growth. A 2013 survey of leading academic economists of varying political affiliations asked for 
reactions to this statement: “Sustained tax and spending policies that boost consumption in ways that reduce 
the saving rate are likely to lower long-run living standards.” More than two-thirds strongly agreed or agreed. 
The rest either were uncertain or had no opinion. Remarkably, no one disagreed (IGM Forum, 2013).
10 To be clear, however, the desirability of issuing safe, liquid assets is a justification for gross issuance of debt, 
not a reason for the government to run deficits. The government could increase the supply of safe, liquid 
assets and invest the funds in a broad-based market portfolio. That is, saying that the government should 
issue safe, liquid assets is different from saying that the government should postpone paying for its current 
programs and instead should raise burdens on future generations.
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spending benefit. As a result, national saving—the sum of private and public saving—
falls. Once national saving falls, future national income will fall; it is only a question 
of how. If it generates higher interest rates, government borrowing will crowd out 
domestic investment, and future output will be lower than it otherwise would have 
been. Even if interest rates don’t rise at all, future national income still falls. The 
increase in government borrowing would be financed, in this case, by increased 
borrowing from abroad. That allows the country to maintain its current investment 
and output path, but it still causes future income to decline, since a larger share of 
that output would be diverted to repaying foreign capital holders.11  
There is abundant empirical evidence consistent with these views—that sustained 
deficits and high debt reduce national saving, investment, and growth, and raise capital 
inflows and interest rates.12  These effects can be substantial. Extrapolating from the 
empirical and simulation literatures, a reduction of 60 percentage points in the debt-
to-GDP ratio (e.g., from 160% to 100%) would raise the real annual growth rate by 
0.6 to 1.2 percentage points according to a study by IMF researchers (Woo & Kumar, 
2015).  It would raise the long-term GNP level by estimates that range from 4.0% (CBO, 
2016a) to 5.7% (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999), and 4.2% to 10.5% according to another 
CBO study (Page & Santoro, 2010), depending on how other policies change.  
Likewise, in my recent book, Fiscal Therapy, I propose a series of policy changes that 
would reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% by 2050, compared to a 180% figure that 
would be reached under the assumptions in the analysis (Gale, 2019). Analysts at the 
Penn-Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) estimate that these changes would raise GDP 
by 7% and GNP by 8% (Ricco, Prisinzano, & Shin, 2019). This implies that a reduction 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percentage points, coupled with similar policies, would 
raise long-term GDP by 3.5% and GNP by 4%.  
All these estimates are based on extrapolating the effects of large changes in debt 
from evidence on the effects of smaller changes in debt. Thus, the usual cautions 
about out-of-sample predictions apply. If anything, though, the extrapolations are 
likely to understate the effects of large debt changes.13 
11 GDP measures the output produced in the country. Gross national product (GNP) measures the income that 
accrues to Americans. GNP equals GDP less the income earned in the United States by foreigners plus the 
foreign income earned by Americans.
12 For the impact of debt on growth and investment, see Baum, Checherita-Westphal, and Rother (2012); Caner, 
Grennes, and Koehler-Geib (2010); Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011); Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran, 
and Raissi (2015); Wilson et al. (2012); and Woo and Kumar (2015). For debt and interest rates, see Engen and 
Hubbard (2005); Gale and Orszag (2004); Gamber and Seliski (2019); Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2012); Laubach (2009); and Tedeschi (2019). For debt and capital flows, see Chinn and Ito (2005, 2008); 
Chinn et al. (2011); and Huntley (2014).
13 The data suggest that while low levels of debt do not necessarily hamper economic performance and may 
even bolster the economy, high debt tends to reduce economic growth, suggesting the marginal effect of 
added debt on the economy may be nonlinear, and it may be rising with higher levels of debt. See Baum, 
Checherita-Westphal, and Rother (2013); Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib (2010); Cechetti, Mohanty, and 
Zampolli (2011); Chudik et al. (2015); Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012); Wilson et al. (2012); and Woo 
and Kumar (2015).
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Notably, short-term empirical patterns tell the same story as the long-term simulations. 
Figure 9, for example, shows that between 1950 and 2018, annual federal saving 
(that is, the opposite of the federal deficit) correlates closely with national saving 
and national investment. Controlling for the business cycle (by including the 
unemployment rate), raising deficits by 1% of the economy reduces both national 
saving and national investment by about 1% of the economy.14  Note that r < g for 
much of this period (Blanchard 2019a, 2019b).
Blanchard (2019a, 2019b) emphasizes that, although sustained deficits would crowd 
out investment and reduce future national income, increased deficits would bring 
about higher consumption and welfare for all generations as long as r < g.15  That 
implies that we can borrow and consume more if interest rates stay low forever. But 
if we accumulate a lot of debt and then rates rise, we will face added burdens. This is 
the “Deficit Gamble” that Ball, Elmendorf, and Mankiw (1998) describe. 
14 This statement is based on linear regressions using annual data on GDP and net national product (NNP) from 
1950 to 2018 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019), controlling for the unemployment rate. The impact of 
federal saving/NNP on national saving/NNP is 1.37 and the impact on investment/NNP is 0.89. All the effects 
are highly statistically significant. Similar findings hold using GDP instead of NNP.
15 Blanchard (2019a, 2019b) distinguishes two interest rates—on government debt and on risky private capital. 
In his model, for increased debt unambiguously to make all generations better off, both rates must be below 
the growth rate.
Figure 9: National Saving, Federal Saving, and Net Domestic Investment, 1950-2018
Source: Author's calculation
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Of course, it is impossible to know the future path of interest rates with certainty. 
But Blanchard (2019b) argues that the situation will remain “manageable” as long 
as interest rates do not rise much above the growth rate. I would note that the 
interpretation of “manageable” is subjective. As shown above, even if r < g for the 
next 30 years under the “standard” interest rate projection, net interest payments rise 
to more than 6% of GDP by 2049. It would be reasonable to conjecture that many 
people would find that situation problematic. If the interest rate were to rise above 
the growth rate, interest payments would be even higher.
3.2 Debt and Financial Crisis
In recent decades, prominent economists and leading Wall Street figures of both 
political parties have expressed concern that America could experience a kind of 
“hard landing” or crisis, similar to what happened in Greece.16  Nevertheless, I doubt 
that we’ll see a sudden scenario in the United States in the foreseeable future, for 
several reasons. Current low interest rates indicate that markets are absorbing 
recent increases in government debt without fear of future capital flight or default. 
We undoubtedly have the resources to pay our debt for decades to come. We issue 
bonds in our own currency (as do Britain and Japan), giving us an important lever of 
control over our debt, and the dollar is the world’s reserve currency.17  The United 
States remains the world’s safest place to invest; even after the financial crisis that 
began here in 2007 and spread across the world, investors flooded U.S. markets in 
search of safe assets, helping to keep interest rates low. 
To be sure, policymakers could create an emergency by forcing a default on the 
country’s debt, as right-wing leaders and commentators threatened to bring about 
during the debt ceiling standoffs in 2011 and 2013 (Bartlett, 2013; Weisman, 2013). 
An intentional default would be a big mistake. A financial crisis would turn out poorly, 
of course, and it would make the need to address the fiscal challenge even more 
compelling. 
But I believe that focusing on the potential for a crisis is misleading, in two ways. First, 
it seems like an extremely remote possibility. Second, it implicitly suggests that the 
potential to cause a crisis is the reason we should care about debt. In contrast, the key 
point in my view is that even if a crisis does not materialize, the United States still faces 
a debt problem. It’s just one that’s growing gradually. This may be less exciting than a 
crisis, but it can still be plenty damaging. 
16 If a crisis were to arise, it could spread quickly. Global financial markets can respond to events virtually 
instantaneously, and policymakers can lose control of things just as quickly. As Rudiger Dornbusch (1997) 
said of Mexico’s financial crisis of the 1990s, “The crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think, and 
then it happens much faster than you would have thought… It took forever and then it took a night.”
17 The rise of cryptocurrencies and efforts to avoid U.S. trade sanctions may be creating threats to the use of the 
dollar as a reserve currency (Michaels, 2019; Scheck & Hope, 2019).
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3.3 Intergenerational Burdens
Besides its impact on overall macroeconomic performance, issuing debt shifts the 
burden of financing government to future generations (assuming the increase in 
debt is financing government consumption or transfer payments that will largely raise 
private consumption as opposed to investments that will pay dividends in the future). 
There is a natural tendency to think that future generations will be better off than 
we are, and therefore that pushing the debt forward would simply be asking more 
affluent people than ourselves to bear the burden. It is not clear, however, how much 
better off future generations will be relative to current generations. Absolute income 
mobility has been declining over the last few decades (Figure 10). Among people 
born in 1940, more than 90% had higher real income as (young) adults than their 
parents did. 
Among those born in 1980, only slightly more than half had higher real income than 
their parents (Chetty et al., 2017). If that pattern continues, many members of future 
generations will be worse off in absolute terms than their parents and thus will be less 
well-prepared to address a higher debt burden than earlier generations.
Figure 10: Percent of Children Earning More Than Their Parents
Source: Author's calculation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Per
cen
t
Child's Birth Cohort
Source: Chetty et al. (2017)
Figure 10. Percent of Children Earning More than Their Parents
96 Part II: Rising Federal Debt and Slowing Economic Productivity 
3.4 Debt and Politics 
High and rising debt can affect political choices as well. In the face of fiscal pressures, 
policymakers will naturally be less willing to raise debt or deficits further and perhaps 
more willing to impose PAYGO requirements on new programs (Romer & Romer, 
2017). This will make it harder to enact new initiatives that respond to economic, 
social, military, or other needs. For example, countries with low debt-to-GDP ratios 
at the beginning of a financial crisis tend to have smaller declines in output than 
countries with higher debt loads. The reason is that countries with low debt-to-GDP 
ratios are more willing to enact expansionary policies (Romer & Romer, 2019).18  
Another dimension of the impact of debt on political choices occurs through the 
effects of rising interest payments, which will require either higher taxes, cuts in other 
spending, or acceptance of higher deficits. This concern is particularly salient under 
the standard interest rate scenario, where interest payments rise from 1.8% of GDP 
in 2019 to 6.2% in 2049. By 2049, even with r < g throughout the entire projection 
period, interest payments would exceed the sum of all discretionary spending. The 
explosive growth in interest payments, assuming no policy changes, highlights the 
importance of getting the debt under control sooner rather than later.
More broadly, high debt may reduce America’s global standing in political and 
military terms. The precise mechanism through which this might occur is unclear, but 
the general idea is that economic strength and political strength go hand in hand.19 
4. Fiscal Targets and The Fiscal Gap 
4.1 Alternative Targets 
Determining optimal fiscal policy is a task fraught with uncertainty. While it is hard to 
argue that the current debt path is optimal, it is even more difficult to ascertain what 
would be optimal. 
The long-term solution should be a stable situation—defined either in terms of 
debt or interest payments, relative to GDP. But economic theory offers such a wide 
range of plausible estimates for the optimal debt-to-GDP ratio that it’s difficult to 
18 Indeed, some have argued that a conservative government would want to run up debt specifically to 
constrain the choices of future governments (Persson & Svensson, 1989).
19 For example, in 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said “the single, biggest 
threat to our national security is our debt.” See Marshall (2011). As Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman (1988) noted 
30 years ago, “World power and influence have historically accrued to creditor countries. It is not coincidental 
that America emerged as a world power simultaneously with our transition from a debtor nation ... to a 
creditor supplying investment capital to the rest of the world.” Adam Posen (2014), president of the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, argues that unsustainable fiscal policy will make it harder for the United 
States to maintain its standing in global trade talks and disputes.
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reach conclusions based on first principles (Aiyagari & McGrattan, 1997; Blanchard 
2019a; Peterman & Sager, 2017). Empirically, there are three natural benchmarks to 
consider. The current ratio is about 78%. The maximum historical ratio was 106%, 
during World War II. The average ratio from the 50 years between 1957 and 2007 
was 36%. This period, which might be described as “normal,” begins after debt as a 
share of the economy was cut in half relative to World War II levels and ends before 
the financial crisis. 
Both objective and subjective factors influence the determination of the optimal 
level. Objectively, the more that debt hurts long-term growth, the lower the optimal 
level. A key parameter is the relation between interest rates and growth rates. Higher 
interest rates raise the cost of financing and reduce the optimal debt level. Faster 
economic growth–through productivity growth or labor force expansion–raises the 
optimal debt-to-GDP ratio, just like a family that expects its future income to rise can 
responsibly assume more debt. 
If r < g, the government can rollover existing debt without raising the debt-to-GDP 
ratio (Blanchard, 2019a). That, by itself, does not solve the fiscal problem, however. 
Because U.S. projected primary deficits are positive and large (Figure 2), the U.S. 
debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise continually, as noted above, even with r < g. 
Blanchard (2019a) highlights conditions—essentially, that the relevant interest rate be 
below the growth rate—under which a sustained increase in deficits and debt could 
make all generations better off. If those conditions do not hold, however—and it is 
impossible to be certain they will hold in the future—the key subjective issue is how 
much of the debt burden each generation should bear. Generally, the costs of debt 
reduction come before the benefits fully kick in, since the benefits, namely higher 
economic growth, accumulate slowly over time. As a result, society’s willingness to 
assume current costs for future gains will affect the optimal choice of debt. Deciding 
which individuals within each generation should bear the burden of debt is a related 
question that serves to link debates about trends in income inequality and economic 
opportunity with debates about fiscal consolidation.
The arguments for a higher optimal debt-to-GDP ratio in the future compared to 
various points in the past focus on two points:  The interest rate on government debt 
is projected to be less than the economic growth throughout the projection period, 
and  the projected baseline debt levels are already so high, making transitions to 
lower debt levels more expensive. The arguments against letting the ratio rise too 
high include the effects described in the previous section. 
As an alternative metric to the debt-to-GDP ratio, it is not unreasonable to focus on 
interest payments as a share of GDP. Interest payments, as mentioned above, were 
1.6% of GDP in 2018, averaged 1.8% of GDP since 1947, and peaked in 1991 at 
about 3.2% of GDP. One caveat, however, is that using an interest-payment-to-GDP 
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target could require abrupt changes in the budget. For example, a change in the 
interest rate would have a much larger impact on interest payments as a share of the 
economy than on the debt-to-GDP ratio.20 
4.2 Fiscal Gap Estimates 
The “fiscal gap” measures how much policy would have to change on net for the 
government to reach a given fiscal target (debt-to-GDP or interest payments-to-GDP) 
by a particular year, given the date when the initiatives are first implemented.21  For 
example, with standard interest rates, achieving a debt target of 60% of GDP by 2049 
would require a combination of permanent tax increases and spending cuts that 
equal 3.8% of GDP per year if the changes start in 2021 (Table 1). This would equal 
about $800 billion per year in 2019 dollars, with the dollar figure rising at the same 
rate as GDP in future years. There are many ways to make those changes, but they all 
involve enormous changes in policy. In 2019, for example, $800 billion represents a 
46% increase in income tax revenues, a 23% increase in all federal taxes, or a 20% cut 
in all non-interest federal spending. 
Increasing the debt target reduces the fiscal gap. With a 2049 debt target of 100% of 
GDP and standard interest rates, the fiscal gap is 2.3% of GDP; if the target is 140% of 
GDP, the fiscal gap is 0.8% of GDP. 
Delaying action generally increases the fiscal gap (even though r < g). With standard 
interest rates, the fiscal gap is 2.7% of GDP for a debt goal of 100% of GDP if policy 
changes do not begin until 2025, or 3.2% if changes begin in 2029, compared to 
2.3% if they start in 2021. 
As noted, the target could be in terms of interest payments instead of debt. To keep 
interest payments in 2049 no higher than their historical peak of 3.2% of GDP would 
require policy adjustments equal to 2.8% of GDP if policy changes begin in 2021. 
The interest rate assumption has a huge impact on the fiscal estimates. With flat 
interest rates, the fiscal gap falls to 3.0% of GDP with a 60% target (compared to 3.8% 
under standard rates) and 1.3% of GDP with a 100% target (compared to 2.3% under 
standard rates). If action is delayed until 2029, the fiscal gap rises, but only slightly, to 
1.6% of GDP.  
20 For example, consider an economy in steady state with debt/GDP = 100%, r=.02, g=.04, and the primary 
deficit = 2% of GDP. Interest payments would equal 2% of GDP. The deficit (interest payments plus the 
primary deficit) would equal 4% of GDP. If r rose to .03, interest payments would rise to 3% of GDP. Stabilizing 
debt/GDP at its previous value of 100% would require reducing the primary deficit by 1% of GDP via tax 
increases or spending cuts. In contrast, stabilizing interest payments at the previous value of 2% of GDP 
would require cutting the debt-to-GDP ratio to 66.7% —that is, it would require raising taxes or cutting 
spending by 33.3% of GDP.  Even if the interest rate target were phased in over several years, the required 
adjustments would be substantially larger than those required by maintaining a debt-to-GDP target.
21 The fiscal gap methodology was developed by Auerbach (1994) and has been used extensively. For a recent 
example, see Auerbach, Gale, and Krupkin (2018, 2019).
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With a 140 percent-of-GDP debt target or a 3.2 percent-of-GDP interest payment 
target, the fiscal gap is negative—that is, policymakers could expand deficits under 
this scenario and still reach the target for debt or interest payments. 
Long-term budget projections are, of course, uncertain. The CBO (2019c) provides 
a sense of the range of the uncertainty, noting that if interest rates turn out to be 
1 percentage point higher (lower) than currently projected, while still using their 
baseline assumptions for primary spending and revenues, the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
2049 would be 55 percentage points higher (37 percentage points lower).  Likewise, 
if total factor productivity growth were 0.5 percentage points higher (lower) than 
currently projected, the debt-to-GDP ratio would be 38 percentage points lower (41 
percentage points higher).  To be clear, these are very large deviations in values for 
interest rates and productivity, relative to their projected values, so the sensitivity 
analyses suggests that rising future deficits are extremely likely to occur. 
5. Fiscal Policy in the Short- and Long-Run 
5.1 Short-Term Policy
Current deficits are certainly not optimal in any first-best sense. Full-employment 
deficits of 5% of GDP are, and should be, rare. As John Maynard Keynes said, “the 
boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at Treasury.” Yet, perhaps surprisingly, 
the case for adjusting short-term deficits from their current path is weak, unless there 
is a recession, in which case short-term expansionary policy is appropriate.
The case for cutting short-term deficits is almost nil, in my view. Admittedly, cutting 
the current deficit would reduce future debt accumulation, holding the economy 
constant. But with the economy perhaps becoming fragile and interest rates already 
low, there is not much room for monetary policy to respond to the reduction in 
aggregate demand that would come from reducing current deficits. In any case, the 
current deficit is not the problem; the long-term path is. 
The case for raising short-term deficits to finance new investments is based on the 
ideas that we need new investment in infrastructure, research and development, and 
social policy initiatives that generate human capital; the macroeconomy may need a 
boost in the near future; and lower interest rates make more government investment 
projects beneficial and make deficit financing more attractive.22  
22 There are issues regarding what constitutes an investment, and whether that includes only traditional items 
like infrastructure, research and development, and human capital, or if it is extended to include programs 
that provide nutrition, child support, job training, etc. I favor the broader definition on economic grounds but 
recognize the political complications that arise when investment is defined broadly.
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There are some natural caveats to expanding deficit-financed investment, however. 
First, the government still needs to be able to identify and implement high-value 
investments. Low interest rates do not justify “bridges to nowhere.” The social 
opportunity cost of the funds is related to the market return on capital, not the 
government borrowing rate, and it should account for the irreversibility of investments 
(Auerbach, 2019). Second, both the CBO and the PWBM estimate that a tax-funded 
infrastructure program would boost the economy more than a deficit-financed 
program (Congressional Budget Office, 2016b; Penn-Wharton Budget Model, 2018). 
Thus, I support a stronger investment program right now and would prefer that it 
be funded; however, consistent with the ideas that the short-term deficit is not the 
problem and that the nation needs new investments, I would support a well-designed 
investment program that is deficit-financed in the short-term.
Like most other people, I do not advocate for deficit-financed increases in non-
investment spending currently, even with r < g. In the absence of a recession, almost 
no one seems to think that we should increase deficit-financed spending on non-
investment items, even among those who emphasize the role of low interest rates. 
Krugman (2019) notes that “You don’t have to be a deficit scold or debt-worrier to 
believe that really big progressive programs will require major new revenue sources.” 
Furman and Summers (2019) argue for PAYGO to apply to non-investment spending. 
Sarin and Summers (2019a, 2019b) argue for substantial tax increases on the wealthy, 
presumably to finance new spending, not to reduce deficits. 
At one level, this consensus is not surprising, given the size of the current and projected 
deficits. On the other hand, it is puzzling given the emphasis placed on low interest 
rates. After all, the conditions in Blanchard (2019a)—and earlier in Diamond (1965)—
under which low interest rates imply that higher deficits are optimal for current and 
future generations, assume that all government spending is non-investment.  
A related question is whether Congress should impose PAYGO rules, which require 
that new tax cuts or spending increases be “paid for” with other policy changes. The 
argument in favor is straightforward: As Furman and Summers (2019) put it, if you find 
yourself in a hole, you should stop digging. And, it is always appropriate to make it 
salient for political leaders that programs eventually must be paid for. 
But there are arguments against PAYGO rules as well. First, they make it very hard 
to do anything new, but they give existing programs a free pass on accountability. 
The argument in favor of PAYGO is often stated as a variant of “anything worth doing 
is worth paying for.” If that is true, it is not clear why it should not apply to existing 
programs. Second, the long-term projections above are very close to being consistent 
with PAYGO; that is, PAYGO itself does very little to alter the long-term path from 
the projections. Third, the political parties may be more willing to negotiate a long-
term fiscal agreement if PAYGO did not exist, that is, if both sides could act (or could 
credibly threaten to act) recklessly with regard to short-term spending and tax cuts. 
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5.2 Long-Term Policy 
There is widespread agreement that the long-term budget outlook is unsustainable—
even if interest rates stay below the economic growth rate—and needs to be addressed 
at some point. The debate is whether we should be doing anything about it now. To 
be clear, “doing anything” means enacting a set of changes in the near term that 
are implemented over the medium- and long-term. It does not mean cutting debt 
immediately. 
Clearly, the future fiscal situation depends significantly on interest rates—and of course 
on other factors including the state of the economy and policy makers’ choices. The 
question is, essentially, whether we should buy any partial insurance now via a phased-
in debt reduction package against potentially adverse future fiscal outcomes.
Elmendorf (2019) acknowledges that the long-term fiscal outlook is unsustainable 
and must be addressed at some point, but argues against enacting a gradual, 
long-term budget package in the near term. With lower interest rates, he notes, the 
nation can carry more debt than previously thought. Moreover, he is concerned that 
implementing a gradual, long-term debt reduction package would hurt the short-
term economy by reducing current aggregate demand and interest rates, which 
would both make a recession more likely and make it harder for monetary authorities 
to respond to a recession.23  Similarly, Furman and Summers (2019, p.94) argue that 
“if the debt becomes a problem, interest rates will rise … but even if that happens, 
it is not likely to cost so much that it would be worth paying a definite cost today, to 
prevent the small chance of a problem in the future.” In short, there is a long-term 
problem, but these authors argue it is not worth trying to fix it currently. It would be 
better to let the problem ride. 
This could be called the “St. Augustine” approach: “Give me chastity and continency, 
only not yet.” (Pusey, 1909-14; Tax Policy Center, 2019). If so, the St. Augustine view 
begs for a “Hillel” response: “If not now, when?” (Hillel). After all, the economy has been 
strong in recent years and full employment deficits are high. As President Kennedy 
said, “the time to fix the roof is when the sun is shining.” If the answer is “when interest 
rates rise” (as Furman and Summers, 2019 note above), this is a slippery slope. 
Certainly, if r rose to levels above g, some sort of long-term, fiscal containment would 
be clearly needed, because the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise even more rapidly than 
shown above. But if r remains below g and net interest payments rise to exceed 6% 
of GDP, as in the standard interest rate scenario, when should deficit reduction begin? 
23 Elmendorf (2019)  also argues that in the current political environment, most of the fiscal adjustment would 
come on the spending side, when he believes it would more appropriate to have more of adjustment come 
on the revenue side, and that focusing on deficit reduction would take policymakers’ attention away from 
other key issues.
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An even stronger view could be extracted from Rachel and Summers (2019), who 
present evidence that rising public debt has helped the economy in the recent past 
and is boosting the economy now. I have not yet seen anyone argue that the current 
projected long-term debt path will be necessary to bolster an economy suffering 
from long-term, secular stagnation, but that seems to be a possible implication of 
their findings. 
My own views align with a different statement by Furman and Summers (2019, p. 91): 
“The optimal policy from an economic standpoint would be to gradually phase in 
spending cuts or tax increases at a rate that would prevent perpetual growth in the 
national debt as a share of the economy but that would avoid doing serious harm to 
economic demand along the way.” Although they immediately dismiss their idea as 
too “nuanced” for the political system, that does not mean the idea is wrong, and I do 
not see why it is too complex. Social Security reform in 1983, for example, phased in 
a variety of gradual changes, including to the full retirement age, a change that is still 
being implemented. 
The main cost of enacting a gradual, long-term debt reduction plan seems to be that 
it could hurt the current economy if the changes took place too quickly. In principle, 
that seems like an easy problem to address, by phasing in the changes slowly. Of 
course, when policymakers enacted deficit reductions in 2011 and 2013 in the midst 
of weak economies, they imposed the changes immediately, which was a mistake. 
The “gradual” part of a debt-reduction plan matters. 
The benefits of having a plan in place seem clear. First, it would be a first step toward 
dealing with a long-term problem that everyone acknowledges exists. As Furman 
and Summers (2019, p.90) note, “since economists aren’t sure just how costly large 
deficits are, it would be prudent to keep government debt in check in case they turn 
out to be more harmful than expected.” Second, it provides a form of insurance, 
should interest rates begin to rise. There is no guarantee that r will stay low, especially 
given the projected increase in debt. Given the already high and rising level of debt 
relative to GDP, the federal budget has rarely been more vulnerable to interest rate 
shocks. Third, it would provide policymakers with some assurance about the fiscal 
path and thus allow them to address new problems or issues from a framework that 
is fiscally stable. Fourth, it would reduce fiscal policy uncertainty and provide time 
for businesses, investors, and taxpayers to adjust their behavior to new rules. The 
last point is particularly important because abrupt changes are likely to generate 
backlash and thus may be more likely to be undone by future policy actions.   
Another way to “buy insurance” against interest rate fluctuations would be to lengthen 
the maturity structure of the federal debt. Currently, about 30% of privately held public 
debt will mature within a year, 70% within 5 years, and 90% within 10 years (“Table FD-
5,” 2019). Issuing more bonds with longer maturities as the size of the debt rises makes 
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sense conceptually and matches the historical pattern. Doing so can help reduce the 
sensitivity of the budget to short-term interest rate risk. In the past, the argument 
against lengthening the maturity was that it would raise interest payments, given long-
term interest rates are typically higher than short-term rates. Currently, however, the 
yield curve is relatively flat, which makes lengthening the average maturity of federal 
debt more palatable (Figure 11). But it is also important to consider the implications 
of changing the maturity on the overall financial system and on the Fed’s ability to 
conduct quantitative easing, should the economy turn down again.24  
6. Conclusion 
Policymakers face a combination of high and rising debt but relatively low interest 
rates. Low rates help mitigate the costs of debt, but the long-term fiscal outlook is 
troublesome even if interest rates stay below the growth rate for the next 30 years. 
In a similar situation after World War II, the United States ran extremely small primary 
deficits on average for 3 decades. In contrast, future primary deficits are projected 
to be both sustained and persistent, and interest payments are projected to rise 
inexorably. To address the fiscal imbalance, policymakers should enact now a gradual, 
24 For a more complete discussion of these issues, see the excellent contributions in Wessel (2015).
Figure 11: Yield Curve, Closest to May 31 or June 1, Selected Years 1990-2019
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phased-in, long-term plan that would reduce primary deficits substantially over time 
and eventually stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at a plausible level.
2025 Table 1. Fiscal Gaps and Net Interest Through 2049 With Various  
Debt Targets and Interest Rates, Starting in 2021 (Percent of GDP)
       Fiscal Gaps Net Interest in 2049 
         Under Target
  Standard    Flat Standard     Flat
  Interest Interest   Interest Interest
    Rates   Rates    Rates   Rates
Debt target = 60% 3.8 3.0 2.1 1.4
Debt target = 100% 2.3 1.3 3.7 2.3
Start in 2025 2.7 1.4 − −
Start in 2029 3.2 1.6 − −
Debt target = 140% 0.8 -0.5 5.2 3.2
Net Interest = 3.2% of GDP in 2049 2.8 -0.4 3.2 3.2
Memorandum:    
Baseline 2049 debt 169 134 − −
Baseline 2049 net interest 6.2 3.1 − −
Debt goal associated with 3.2%  
    of GDP net interest 88 138 − −
Fiscal Policy With High Debt and Low Interest Rates       105
Appendix A 
Constructing a “Current Policy” Budget Baseline
Constructing a budget projection is part art and part science. The Congressional 
Budget Offices “current law” projections essentially assume that Congress does 
(almost) nothing in the future. For example, the projections assume that temporary tax 
changes expire as scheduled, mandatory programs are reauthorized as scheduled, 
and discretionary spending follows the caps set forth in the Budget Control Act of 
2011 (which were modified in subsequent legislation) through 2021 and remains 
constant in real terms thereafter (CBO, 2019a, 2019b).25  
In contrast, I construct a “current policy” baseline that shows where the budget is 
headed if we stay on what, in my judgment, is our current path (Appendix Table 
1). This is essentially what would happen if Congress follows a “business as usual” 
approach. My projections start with the CBO’s current law estimates and make a 
series of adjustments. These adjustments are not policy recommendations; they 
simply show the effects of what I view as a continuation of current policies. In many 
cases, I utilize estimates that CBO itself provides of alternative policy options.
I assume that, as it has done in the past, Congress makes major temporary tax-cut 
provisions permanent, including the temporary provisions in the 2017 tax act.26  I 
also assume that enacted tax provisions for which implementation has already been 
delayed will be permanently delayed (i.e., the provisions will be cancelled and never 
take effect). This includes the medical device excise tax and the tax on high-premium 
insurance (the “Cadillac Tax”) that were enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act. 
With bipartisan support, the implementation of these taxes was postponed by two 
years in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act in December 2015 and by 
another two years in the Extension of Continuing Appropriations Act of 2018.27  
On the spending side, as mentioned above, the CBO sets discretionary spending 
through 2021 at the levels created by the discretionary spending caps and 
sequestration procedures (as imposed in the Budget Control Act of 2011 and 
modified by the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2013, 2015, and 2018) and then allows 
25 The “current law” scenario does assume that the debt limit is raised as needed.
26 Examples of major expiring provisions in the 2017 tax act include “100% bonus depreciation” (expensing 
of business investment in qualifying equipment), the marginal individual rate cuts, the increased standard 
deduction, the repeal of personal exemptions, the increased estate tax exemption, the cap on state and local 
tax deductions, and the 20% deduction for certain pass-through income. Examples of expiring provisions 
outside of the 2017 tax act include tax credits for biodiesel and alternative fuel mixtures and the deduction 
for mortgage insurance premiums.
27 The revenue adjustments also affect refundable tax credits, which, in accordance with the CBO (2019a, 
2019b), is considered an effect on outlays.
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them rise with inflation. I allow defense spending to rise with inflation, starting in 2020, 
so that real defense expenditures remain constant at 2019 levels.  I allow non-defense 
discretionary spending to rise with the rate of inflation and the rate of population 
growth, so that real, per-capita spending remains constant at its 2019 level.28 Both 
assumptions are meant to reflect a rough approximation of a budget that maintains 
current services. For defense, largely a non-rival public good, it seems reasonable to 
assume that current services can be maintained without regard to population over 
the short-term. For non-defense programs, it is more likely that maintaining current 
services requires a population adjustment. 
In aggregate, my ten-year current policy baseline follows the CBO’s (2019b) 
alternative fiscal scenario, except for the population adjustment I make for non-
defense discretionary spending. 
The CBO (2019b) explains that the deficit for fiscal year 2029 will be about $93 billion 
lower than would otherwise be expected because October 1, 2028 (the beginning 
of fiscal year 2029) will fall on a weekend, thus pushing some October payments 
(mostly for Medicare) up to the end of September in the previous fiscal year. As a 
result, the deficit in 2028 will be larger than otherwise expected. Of these $93 billion 
in payments, $64 billion applies to Medicare. Similar adjustments affect spending 
in fiscal years 2022-2024. Figures in this paper display the adjusted baselines that 
exclude the effects of these timing shifts.29 
Looking only at the next ten years gives an incomplete and overly optimistic picture 
of the fiscal outlook, even with adjustments made to characterize current policy. After 
the initial 10 years, I use long-term economic growth assumptions implied in CBO 
(2019c) without macroeconomic feedback. Over the 2030-2049 period, the average 
nominal economic growth rate is about 4%.
For Medicare and OASDI, I project all elements of spending and dedicated revenues 
(payroll taxes, income taxes on benefits, premiums and contributions from states) 
using the growth rates in the intermediate projections in the 2019 Trustees Reports 
for the period between 2030 and 2049 (The Board of Trustees, 2019; The Boards 
of Trustees, 2019).30  To account for the timing shifts discussed above, Medicare 
spending in 2030 is based on the growth rate of spending between 2029 and 2030 
according to Boards of Trustees (2019) applied to the adjusted Medicare estimate 
for 2029 from the CBO (2019b). For Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies, I use 
growth rates implied by the CBO’s most recent, long-term static projections (CBO 
2019c) through 2049.31 
28 The CBO (2019a, 2019b) uses a mix of the employment cost index and the GDP price index to measure 
inflation.
29 For simplicity, I use the same nominal adjustment for the timing shifts in each scenario.
30 Details of the computations are available from the authors upon request.
31 The static projections are based on macroeconomic forecasts for a constant debt-to-GDP ratio and constant 
marginal tax rates after 2029, that is, excluding the negative effects of economic policy during this period.
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As in the first 10 years, I hold non-defense discretionary spending constant in real, 
per capita terms and defense spending constant in real terms after 2029. I also hold 
mandatory spending for programs other than Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, 
CHIP, and exchange subsidies constant in real per capita terms. 
On the revenue side, I allow income taxes other than those outlined above on Social 
Security and Medicare benefits to grow with “bracket creep” according to the CBO 
(2019c). I assume that all other revenues (corporate taxes, excise taxes, etc.) remain 
constant at their 2029 shares of GDP. 
I examine two alternative interest rate paths. In the standard approach, I follow the 
weighted average nominal interest rates on government debt without macroeconomic 
feedback according to the CBO (2019c) through 2049. Under this path, the weighted 
average nominal interest rate on government debt rises gradually from 2.4% in 2019, 
to 3.4% in 2029, to 3.9% in 2049. 
In the alternative path (“flat interest rates”), the weighted average nominal interest 
rate on government debt is constant over the 30-year projection period at its 2019 
value of 2.4%. 
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10-YEAR WINDOW BEYOND
Interest Rate
as implied in CBO 10-year 
outlook
CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook
Growth Rate
as reported in CBO 10-year 
outlook
CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook
Income Tax
current law + extension of 
temporary tax provisions and 
TCJA provisions
current law + extension of 
temporary tax provisions and  
TCJA provisions
Corporate Tax
current law + extension of 
temporary tax provisions and 
TCJA provisions
constant share of GDP
Payroll taxes current law
grows using assumptions in the 
Social Security Trustees report
Other taxes
current law + repeal of certain 
healthcare taxes
constant share of GDP
OASDI benefits current law grows using assumptions in the 
Social Security Trustees report
Medicare current law
grows using assumptions in the 
Medicare Trustees report
Medicaid, CHIP, and 
Exchange Subsidies
current law
grows using assumptions in CBO 
Long-Term Budget Outlook
Other Mandatory current law grows with inflation and population
Defense grows with inflation grows with inflation
Non-Defense 
Discretionary
grows with inflation and 
population
grows with inflation and  
population
Net Interest
as reported in CBO 10-year 
outlook + adjustments from 
above policy changes
calculated from debt and  
interest rate
Appendix Table 1. Budget Category Assumptions
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Appendix B 
Dispelling Some Canards about Debt and the Economy 
Despite a broad consensus that the long-term fiscal path described in Section 2 is 
worrisome or inappropriate, even with r < g, there are a few false or misleading claims 
that merit specific responses. 
1. We owe it to ourselves, so it is not a problem.
The first false claim is that public debt is not a problem because “we owe it to 
ourselves.” By this statement, people mean that public debt is money that one 
generation borrows and owes to another. How, they ask, can the nation become 
poorer by owing money to ourselves?
The answer is that the historical evidence discussed above on how deficits affect 
growth, saving, investment, and interest rates refers—at least in the U.S. case—to debt 
that we, indeed, largely owed to ourselves. Those deficits and debt affected economic 
performance, through the channels described above. In addition, future generations 
will have to finance that debt via higher taxes or lower spending, and those steps will 
cause pain, especially if we design the policies poorly. 
Also, we increasingly do not owe it to ourselves; we also owe it to investors around 
the world. At the end of 2018, foreign investors held 38% of U.S. federal government 
debt, an amount equal to 30% of our annual GDP (“The depth and breadth,” 2017). 
Those figures are substantially higher than in 1980, when foreign investors held about 
18% of U.S. public debt. 
2. We issue debt in our own currency, so there is not a problem. 
Another argument suggesting that our fiscal situation is not a problem is that we print 
and borrow in our own currency and so can never be forced to default. For instance, 
in 2011 Warren Buffet said, “the United States is not going to have a debt crisis as 
long as we keep issuing our debts in our own currency” (Wood, 2011). However, this 
does not mean that a fiscal problem cannot happen; in 1976, the government of the 
United Kingdom, which issues its own currency and borrows in its own currency, was 
forced to borrow $3.9 billion from the International Monetary Fund when the pound 
rapidly fell in value (“Sterling devalued,” 2019). 
The key issue is the costs and benefits of additional debt accumulation, not the 
limits of federal borrowing. In a recent University of Chicago survey of prominent 
economists, not one agreed that a country that issues debt in its own currency does 
not have to worry about deficits (IGM Forum, 2019). In post-survey comments, even 
adherents to modern, monetary theory, believed that a government that printed its 
own currency needed to be concerned with its level of debt (Mitchell, 2019). 
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3. Ricardian Equivalence says that our rising debt profile does not matter.
There is a school of thought that says that deficits do not reduce growth under certain 
conditions. In particular, the theory behind so-called “Ricardian Equivalence” is that 
a deficit that is created by a temporary, lump-sum tax cut today and then followed 
by a temporary, lump-sum tax increase in the future will not have any impact on 
national saving, investment, growth, or interest rates. The reason is that taxpayers will 
anticipate that their future tax liabilities will rise by the exact amount (in present value) 
of the tax cut they receive, and so they will save the entire tax cut in order to pay the 
future tax increase. Thus, the reduction in government saving due to the tax cut would 
be exactly offset by the increase in private saving, and there would be no change in 
national saving. Ricardian Equivalence is named after the nineteenth-century British 
economist David Ricardo, who did not actually believe in the idea but raised it as a 
conceptual possibility. It was revived intellectually by Harvard economist Robert Barro 
(1974) in a famous (in academia, at least) article. While the theory is intellectually 
elegant, there is significant evidence against it (Bernheim, 1989; Elmendorf & Mankiw, 
1999), and, in any case, it does not apply to the situation facing the country—namely, 
rising long-term deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios that finance government and private 
consumption. Virtually all economists, including Barro (2012), agree that if current 
budget projections play out, they will cause long-term economic harm. 
Fiscal Policy With High Debt and Low Interest Rates       111
References
Aiyagari, S. R., & McGrattan, E. R. (1997). The optimum quantity of debt (No. 203). Retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis website: https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/
fedmsr/203.html
Auerbach, A. J. (1994). The U.S. Fiscal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got Here and Where We’re Going (Working Paper No. 4709). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://
doi.org/10.3386/w4709
Auerbach, A. J. (2019). Rethinking Fiscal Policy. In O. Blanchard & L. H. Summers (Eds.), 
Evolution or Revolution: Rethinking Macroeconomics After the Great Recession. 
Retrieved from https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/evolution-or-revolution-olivier-
blanchard/1129557050
Auerbach, A. J., Gale, W. G., & Krupkin, A. (2018). The federal budget outlook: We are not 
winning. Retrieved from The Brookings Institution website: https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-federal-budget-outlook-we-are-not-winning/
Auerbach, A. J., Gale, W. G., & Krupkin, A. (2019). If not now, when? New estimates of the 
federal budget outlook. Retrieved from The Brookings Institution website: https://www.
brookings.edu/research/if-not-now-when-new-estimates-of-the-federal-budget-outlook/
Ball, L., Elmendorf, D. W., & Mankiw, N. G. (1995). The Deficit Gamble (Working Paper No. 
5015). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w5015
Barro, R. J. (1974). Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 
1095-117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/260266  
Barro, R. J. (2012, May 9). Stimulus Spending Keeps Falling. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 
from https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577390482019129156
Bartlett, B. (2013, October 14). For Many Hard-Liners, Debt Default Is the Goal. Retrieved 
from: https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/for-many-hard-liners-debt-
default-is-the-goal/
Baum, A., Checherita-Westphal, C., & Rother, P. (2012). Debt and Growth: New Evidence for 
the Euro Area (Working Paper No. 1450). Retrieved from European Central Bank website: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1450.pdf
Bernheim, B. D. (1989). A Neoclassical Perspective on Budget Deficits. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3(2), 55–72. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.3.2.55
Blanchard, O. (2019a). Public Debt and Low Interest Rates. American Economic Review, 
109(4), 1197–1229. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.109.4.1197
Blanchard, O. (2019b). Public Debt: Fiscal and Welfare Costs in a Time of Low Interest Rates 
(Policy brief 19-2). Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrieved from https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb19-2.pdf
Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2019). Table 5.1 Saving and Investment by Sector. Retrieved from https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&nipa_table_
list=137&categories=survey
Caner, M., Grennes, T., & Koehler-Geib, F. (2010). Finding the Tipping Point -- When Sovereign 
Debt Turns Bad (Working Paper No. WPS5391; pp. 1–15). Retrieved from The World Bank 
website: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/509771468337915456/Finding-
the-tipping-point-when-sovereign-debt-turns-bad
112 Part II: Rising Federal Debt and Slowing Economic Productivity 
Cecchetti, S. G., Mohanty, S., & Zampolli, F. (2011). Achieving growth amid fiscal imbalances: 
the real effects of debt. Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, 
145–196.
Chetty, R., Grusky, D., Hell, M., Hendren, N., Manduca, R., & Narang, J. (2016). The Fading 
American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940 (Working Paper No. 
22910). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w22910
Chinn, M. D., Eichengreen, B., & Ito, H. (2011). A Forensic Analysis of Global Imbalances 
(Working Paper No. 17513). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.
org/10.3386/w17513
Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2005). Current Account Balances, Financial Development and 
Institutions: Assaying the World (Working Paper No. 11761). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w11761
Chinn, M., & Ito, H. (2008). Global Current Account Imbalances: American Fiscal Policy versus 
East Asian Savings. Review of International Economics, 16(3), 479–498.
Chudik, A., Mohaddes, K., Pesaran, M. H., & Raissi, M. (2015). Is There a Debt-threshold 
Effect on Output Growth? (No. WP15/197). Retrieved from International Monetary Fund 
website: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Is-There-a-Debt-
threshold-Effect-on-Output-Growth-43260
Congressional Budget Office. (2016a). The 2016 Long-Term Budget Outlook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51580
Congressional Budget Office. (2016b). The Macroeconomic and Budgetary Effects of Federal 
Investment. Retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51628
Congressional Budget Office. (2019a). The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029 | Congressional Budget Office. Retrieved from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54918
Congressional Budget Office. (2019b). Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029. Retrieved 
from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55151
Congressional Budget Office. (2019c). The 2019 Long-Term Budget Outlook. Retrieved from 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55331 
Diamond, P. A. (1965). National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model. The American 
Economic Review, 55(5), 1126–1150.
Dornbusch, R. (1997, April 8). Murder, Money, & Mexico | FRONTLINE | PBS. Retrieved from 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/etc/script.html
Elmendorf, D. (2019, April). Should We Reduce Federal Budget Deficits Now? Presented at 
the Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.hks.harvard.edu/more/about/leadership-administration/deans-office/deans-presentations/should-we-reduce-federal
Elmendorf, D. W., & Gregory Mankiw, N. (1999). Government debt. In Handbook of 
Macroeconomics (Vol. 1, Part C, pp. 1615–1669). Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.
org/h/eee/macchp/1-25.html
Elmendorf, D. W., & Sheiner, L. M. (2017). Federal Budget Policy with an Aging Population and 
Persistently Low Interest Rates. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(3), 175–194. https://
doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.3.175
Engen, E. M., & Hubbard, R. G. (2005). Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates. NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2004, Volume 19, 83–160.
Friedman, B. (1988). Day of Reckoning: The Consequences of American Economic Policy 
under Reagan and After. New York: Random House.
Fiscal Policy With High Debt and Low Interest Rates       113
Furman, J., & Summers, L. H. (2019, February 25). Who’s Afraid of Budget Deficits? Foreign 
Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-01-27/whos-afraid-budget-deficits
Gale, W. G. (2019). Fiscal Therapy: Curing America’s Debt Addiction and Investing in the 
Future. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gale, W. G., & Orszag, P. R. (2004). Budget Deficits, National Saving, and Interest Rates. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004(2), 101–210. https://doi.org/10.1353/
eca.2005.0007
Gamber, E., & Seliski, J. (2019). The Effect of Government Debt on Interest Rates: Working 
Paper 2019-01. Retrieved from Congressional Budget Office website: https://www.cbo.
gov/publication/55018
Hillel. (n.d.). 1:14. In Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers).
Huntley, J. (2014). The Long-Run Effects of Federal Budget Deficits on National Saving and 
Private Domestic Investment: Working Paper 2014-02 (No. 45140). Retrieved from Congressional Budget Office website: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cbo/wpaper/45140.html
IGM Forum. (2013, July 8). Fiscal Policy and Savings. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from IGM Forum website: http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/fiscal-policy-and-savings
IGM Forum. (2019, March 13). Modern Monetary Theory. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from IGM 
Forum website: http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/modern-monetary-theory
International Monetary Fund. (2019). World Economic Outlook (April 2019) - General 
government gross debt. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO
Krishnamurthy, A., & Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2012). The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt. 
Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), 233–267. https://doi.org/10.1086/666526
Krugman, P. (2012, December 27). Futurism and Policy. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from Paul 
Krugman Blog website: https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/futurism-and-
policy/
Krugman, P. (2019, February 12). What’s Wrong With Functional Finance? Retrieved June 21, 
2019, from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/opinion/whats-wrong-with-functional-finance-wonkish.html
Laubach, T. (2009). New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4), 858–885. Retrieved from JSTOR.
Marshall, T. C. (2011, September 22). Debt is Biggest Threat to National Security, Chairman 
Says. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://archive.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=65432
Mauro, P., Romeu, R., Binder, A., & Zaman, A. (2013). A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy. Retrieved from International Monetary Fund website: https://www.imf.
org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/A-Modern-History-of-Fiscal-Prudence-and-Profligacy-40222
Michaels, D. (2019, June 19). Fed, Congress Promise Scrutiny of Facebook Cryptocurrency.” 
The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-congress-
promise-scrutiny-of-facebook-cryptocurrency-11560983531
Mitchell, B. (2019, March 19). Fake surveys and Groupthink in the economics profession. 
Retrieved June 23, 2019, from Modern Monetary Theory website: http://bilbo.
economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=41823
114 Part II: Rising Federal Debt and Slowing Economic Productivity 
OECD. (2019). Economic Outlook Annex Tables. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from OECD 
website: https://www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/economic-outlook-annex-tables.htm
Page, B. R., & Santoro, M. (2010). Economic impacts of waiting to resolve the long-term 
budget imbalance. Retrieved from https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo1925/12-10-
CostWaitingBrief.pdf
Penn Wharton Budget Model. (2018). The White House FY 2019 Infrastructure Plan. Retrieved 
from https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/2/19/the-white-house-
infrastructure-plan
Persson, T., & Svensson, L.E.O. (1989). Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: 
Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 325-
45. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/2937850. 
Peterman, W. B., & Sager, E. (2017). Optimal Public Debt with Life Cycle Motives. Retrieved 
from Macroeconomics Research Workshop website: https://www.eui.eu/Documents/
DepartmentsCentres/Economics/Seminarsevents/Peterman-Draft-Paper.pdf
Posen, A. (2014). Introduction: The Costs of Behaving Badly. In PIIE Briefing: Vol. 14–1. 
Flirting with Default: Issues Raised by Debt Confrontations in the United States (pp. 1–2). Retrieved from https://piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/flirting-default-issues-raised-
debt-confrontations-united-states
Pusey, E. B. (1909). The Confessions of Saint Augustine: Book VIII. Retrieved from https://www.
sacred-texts.com/chr/augconf/aug08.htm
Rachel, L., & Summers, L.H. (2019). On Falling Neutral Rates, Fiscal Policy, and the Risk of 
Secular Stagnation.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2019. Retrieved 
from Brookings website: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/On-
Falling-Neutral-Real-Rates-Fiscal-Policy-and-the-Risk-of-Secular-Stagnation.pdf
Reinhart, C., Reinhart, V., & Rogoff, K. (2012). Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-Economy 
Episodes since 1800. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3), 69–86.
Ricco, J., Prisinzano, R., & Shin, S. (2019, April 9). Analysis of Fiscal Therapy: Conventional and 
Dynamic Estimates. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/4/9/analysis-of-fiscal-therapy-conventional-and-dynamic-estimates
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2017). Why Some Times Are Different: Macroeconomic Policy 
and the Aftermath of Financial Crises (Working Paper No. 23931). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23931
Romer, C. D., & Romer, D. H. (2019, March 7). Fiscal space and the aftermath of financial 
crises: How it matters and why. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from Brookings website: https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/fiscal-space-and-the-aftermath-of-financial-crises-
how-it-matters-and-why/
Sarin, N., & Summers, L. H. (2019a, March 28). A broader tax base that closes loopholes 
would raise more money than plans by Ocasio-Cortez and Warren. The Boston Globe. 
Retrieved June 23, 2019, from: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/03/28/
broader-tax-base-that-closes-loopholes-would-raise-more-money-than-plans-ocasio-
cortez-and-warren/Bv16zhTAkuEx08SiNrjx9J/story.html
Sarin, N., & Summers, L. H. (2019b, March 28). Fair, comprehensive tax reform is the right path 
forward. The Boston Globe. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from https://www.bostonglobe.
com/opinion/2019/03/28/fair-comprehensive-tax-reform-right-path-forward/
DwzX8IbqbRY5zxaCy2DoBI/story.html
Fiscal Policy With High Debt and Low Interest Rates       115
Scheck, J., & Hope, B. (2019, May 29). The Dollar Underpins American Power. Rivals 
Are Building Workarounds. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://www.
wsj.com/articles/the-dollar-powers-american-dominance-rivals-are-building-
workarounds-11559155440
Sinn, H.W. (2012). The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach to Global Warming. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press. 
Sterling devalued and the IMF loan. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/cabinetpapers/themes/sterling-devalued-imf-loan.htm
Tax Policy Center. (2019, April 10). Fiscal Therapy: Curing America’s Debt Addiction and 
Investing in the Future. 4th Annual Lubick Symposium, Brookings Institution. Retrieved from Brookings website https://www.brookings.edu/events/fiscal-therapy-curing-
americas-debt-addiction-and-investing-in-the-future 
Table FD-5. (2019). In U.S. Treasury Bulletin. Retrieved from https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-
statements/treasury-bulletin/
Tedeschi, E. (2019, February 19). Deficits are Raising Interest Rates. But Other Factors 
are Lowering Them. Medium. Retrieved June 21, 2019, from https://medium.com/bonothesauro/deficits-are-raising-interest-rates-but-other-factors-are-lowering-them-
6d1e68776b7a
The Board of Trustees. (2019). The 2019 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Retrieved 
from https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2019/tr2019.pdf
The Boards of Trustees. (2019). 2019 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal 
Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds. Retrieved 
from https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2019.pdf
The depth and breadth of the federal debt. (2017, March 2). Retrieved June 23, 2019, 
from The FRED Blog website: https://fredblog.stlouisfed.org/2017/03/the-depth-and-
breadth-of-the-federal-debt/
U.S. Department of Treasury. 2019. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates. Retrieved from https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.
aspx?data=yield 
Weisman, J. (2013, October 8). Many in G.O.P. Offer Theory: Default Wouldn’t Be That Bad. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/politics/
many-in-gop-offer-theory-default-wouldnt-be-that-bad.html
Wessel, D. (Ed.). (2015). The $13 Trillion Question. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.
edu/book/the-13-trillion-question/
Williams, R. C. III. (2016). “Environmental Taxation.” (Working Paper No. 22303). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w22303.pdf.  
Wilson, D., Himmelberg, C. P., Karoui, L., Trivedi, K., Ursua, J., Burgi, C., … Cole, G. (2012). Are 
There Fewer “Safe” Assets Than Before? Global Economics Weekly, (12), 8.
Woo, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2015). Public Debt and Growth. Economica, 82(328), 705–739. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12138
Wood, B. (2011, May 17). Buffett’s silly talk about the U.S. debt. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/buffetts-silly-talk-about-the-us-debt-2011-05-17
